10 Genetically identical cells in microbial populations often exhibit a remarkable degree of 11 phenotypic heterogeneity even in homogenous environments. While such heterogeneity 12
Introduction 30
Stochastic gene expression is ubiquitous in biological systems [1] [2] [3] [4] . While some noise in 31 gene expression is inevitable, phenotypic heterogeneity is an evolvable trait whose 32 quantitative parameters can be tuned by the architecture and properties of the underlying 33 gene network [5] [6] [7] [8] . This raises the question of what adaptive advantage might be conferred 34 to cells that implement stochastic decision-making 9, 10 . Microbial phenotypic 35 heterogeneity is most often thought to be a response to environmental uncertainty; 36 populations that "hedge their bets" by stochastically adopting a range of phenotypes can 37 gain a fitness advantage if the environment shifts unexpectedly 6, 7, 9, [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] . For example, 38 bacteria may, at some frequency, stochastically adopt a dormant or slow-growing 39 "persister" state, which has reduced fitness when times are good, but which is more likely 40 to survive in the event of catastrophic environmental stress 12, 17 . 41
42
Other evolutionary drivers of heterogeneity, such as altruistic divisions of labor and 43 evolutionary "hawk-dove" (or snowdrift) games, are distinct from bet-hedging in that 44 they result from interactions between individuals within populations, and can manifest 45 even in deterministic environments [18] [19] [20] [21] . Altruistic divisions of labor occur when one 46 phenotype sacrifices its fitness to increase the fitness of the remaining population. 47
Canonical examples include the self-sacrificing virulent phenotype of S. typhimurium 2,22 48 and colicin production, in which toxin is only released upon cell lysis 23 . Because there 49 exists the potential for an individual to gain a fitness advantage by never adopting the 50 low-fitness phenotype, such altruistic divisions of labor must generally be maintained by 51 inclusive fitness effects such as kin or group selection 15, 24 . In contrast, phenotypes in 52 hawk-dove games are mutually invasible. Such games tend toward an equilibrium 53 wherein all phenotypes have equal fitness: either a stable coexistence of pure strategies or 54 a single evolutionarily stable mixed strategy (mixed ESS). Identifying which of these 55 three evolutionary drivers (hawk-dove games, uncertain environment, altruistic division 56 of labor) is at work in a given phenotypically heterogeneous population is complicated by 57 the possibility that multiple of these phenomena can coexist in a given system 20, 25 . 58
While bet-hedging and altruistic division of labor have been observed in microbial 59 populations [11] [12] [13] 22, 25 , the relevance of hawk-dove games to microbial phenotypic 60 heterogeneity remains largely unexplored. 61 62 Evolutionary game theory concerns itself with situations in which the fitness of a 63 phenotype is a function not only of the individual's own phenotype, but of the 64 phenotypes adopted by other individuals. In the hawk-dove game of animal conflict (Box 65 1), neither pure strategy (ie "play hawk" or "play dove") is evolutionarily stable, since 66 populations of each can be invaded by a minority population of the other. Because of this 67 mutual invasibility, if allowed to evolve, the system reaches a stable equilibrium that 68 contains a mix of phenotypes. In microbial populations, such negative frequency 69 dependent interactions have been shown to stabilize the coexistence of different genes 26-70 28 .. However, a genetically identical population can theoretically achieve the same stable 71 mix of phenotypes, provided each individual randomizes between strategies with the 72 appropriate probabilities. Such stochastic choices between strategies are called mixed 73 strategies, and the specific probabilistic strategy that implements a stable equilibrium is 74 the evolutionarily stable mixed strategy (or mixed ESS). 75
76
Mixed ESS in hawk-dove games have several experimentally observable characteristics 77 that distinguish them from bet-hedging strategies and altruistic divisions of labor (Table  78 1). The primary defining characteristic of the hawk-dove game is that the pure strategies, 79 or phenotypes, are mutually invasible: each pure strategy can invade the other when rare. 80
Secondly, if the mixed strategy is evolutionarily stable, all individuals in the 81 population-and potential invaders implementing any other strategy, pure or mixed-will 82 receive an equal payoff 29 . Thirdly, while other strategies of phenotypic variation 83 maximize some measure of population growth (see discussion and Table 1) , 84 evolutionarily stable mixed strategies are not necessarily growth optimal for a population 85 (Box 1) 30 . 86
87

Results
88
To study stable mixed strategies in the laboratory, we investigated the decision of the 89 budding yeast S. cerevisiae regarding which carbon source to consume. Yeast prefers the 90 sugar glucose, but when glucose is limited yeast can consume other carbon sources 31 . The 91 well-studied yeast GAL network contains the suite of genes required to metabolize the 92 sugar galactose. The GAL network activates as a phenotypic switch: each cell is either 93 GAL-ON or GAL-OFF 32, 33 . The network is under catabolite repression by glucose 31 ; 94 however, yeast can still activate the GAL genes in the presence of modest glucose 95 concentrations provided there is galactose in the media as well. Furthermore, in a wide 96 range of glucose and galactose environments, the GAL network is neither uniformly 97 activated or deactivated across the population, but is expressed bimodally 33, 34 (Figure 98 S1). In mixed sugar conditions, a tradeoff exists between activation and repression of the 99 GAL network: activation of the GAL network in the presence of glucose may provide 100 some benefits to the cell in consuming galactose 34 , but expression of the GAL genes also 101 imposes a significant metabolic cost ( Figure S2 ). Similar tradeoffs in catabolite-102 repressed networks have been characterized previously 7, [35] [36] [37] , but have been studied in 103 the context of sympatric speciation or bet-hedging. 104 105 GAL bimodality in mixed glucose and galactose suggests a similarity to the following 106 hawk-dove-like foraging game. In this game, an isogenic population is confronted with a 107 phenotypic decision to "specialize" in consuming one or the other of two limited food 108 sources, A and B ( Figure 1A-B ). The more individuals who adopt the pure strategy 109 "specialize in A," the more quickly A will be consumed, reducing the payout to 110 individuals who chose that strategy. Hence, if all individuals choose "specialize in A," an 111 incentive may exist for an individual to choose instead "specialize in B," and vice versa. 112
The resulting equilibrium consists of a stable mix of the two pure strategies; therefore, an 113 isogenic population that can adopt that stable mix via phenotypic heterogeneity would be 114 uninvasible. 115 116 Given the bimodal expression of the yeast GAL network in some conditions, we sought 117 to probe experimentally whether this phenotypic heterogeneity might be the 118 implementation of an evolutionarily stable mixed strategy in response to a foraging game. 119
Since mutual invasibility of phenotypes is the defining characteristic of a hawk-dove 120 game, we began by competing mutant "pure strategists" at many initial population 121 frequencies. As a GAL-OFF pure strategist, we used a yeast strain whose native GAL80 122 (a repressor of the GAL network, Figure 1C ) was replaced with a mutant version 123 containing a tet-inducible promoter 33 . As a GAL-ON pure strategist, we used a mutant 124 whose GAL3 (a repressor of GAL80, Figure 1C ) was similarly tet-inducible. We 125 confirmed that, in the range of glucose and galactose concentrations that induce 126 bimodality in the wild type yeast, our doxycycline-induced GAL-OFF and GAL-ON pure 127 strategists are unimodally inactivated and activated, respectively, for GAL gene 128 expression ( Figure 1D , Figure S1 ). 129
130
To test for negative frequency dependence between the pure strategists, we mixed six 131 biological replicate pairs of RFP-labeled GAL-ON and CFP-labeled GAL-OFF strains at 132 a total of 60 different initial frequencies, and incubated them for 20 hours in a mixed 133 glucose and galactose environment. To calculate precise fitness values for both strains, 134
we measured population frequencies before and after incubation via flow cytometry. We 135 found that small populations of each pure strategist were indeed able to invade majority 136 populations of the other ( Figure 2B ). Our experimental yeast populations therefore 137 display mutual invasibility between the two pure strategists. Furthermore, there was a 138 unique stable equilibrium frequency of GAL-ON cells that resulted in the same fitness for 139 both pure strategies. Importantly, we find that the frequency of GAL-ON cells that is 140 evolutionary stable is not the frequency that maximizes population growth. Populations 141 with much higher fractions of GAL-ON cells than the equilibrium population grow to 142 saturating density more quickly than the evolutionarily stable population ( Figure 2C ). 143 144 A more in-depth investigation of the dynamics between the pure strategists indicates that 145 the negative frequency dependence is related to the depletion of glucose in the media. 146
Both pure strategists adopt a diauxic growth model; they consume primarily glucose until 147 it is depleted ( Figure S2E ). Indeed, recent evidence argues that the advantage provided to 148 GAL-ON cells may be primarily due to their ability to consume galactose quickly when 149 the glucose is exhausted 34 . The GAL-ON pure strategist suffers a fitness disadvantage 150 while glucose is still relatively abundant, but outcompetes the GAL-OFF pure strategist 151 when the glucose becomes low and galactose remains. The GAL-OFF and GAL-ON 152 strategies can therefore be thought of as "specialists" in glucose and galactose, 153 respectively. The hawk-dove game arises because the galactose "payoff" goes to the 154 GAL-ON cells, but the more cells that activate their GAL networks in a population, the 155 slower the glucose gets depleted, and the higher the resulting payoff to glucose specialists 156 ( Figure S2 ). 157
158 Game theory predicts that varying the payoff structure of a hawk-dove game 159 correspondingly alters the Nash equilibrium fractions (Box 1). In the context of the 160 simple foraging game, this simply means that if food source A increases, then the stable 161 equilibrium should shift towards a larger fraction of the population specializing in food 162 source A. To test for this phenomenon in the GAL network, we replicated the initial 163 competition of our two pure strategists in eight different concentrations of glucose and 164 galactose. More galactose yields a higher equilibrium fraction of GAL-ON cells, while 165 more glucose yields a lower equilibrium fraction of GAL-ON cells (Figure 3 ). The stable 166 equilibrium between our pure strategists therefore shifts as predicted by a negative 167 frequency dependent game. However, while this well-behaved shifting of the equilibrium 168 is robust within a range of relatively low sugars, the pattern breaks down in environments 169 of high total sugar concentrations (>0.1%), where carbon may not be limiting in the same 170 way. 171 172 Because the Nash equilibrium mix of pure strategies is a function of sugar concentrations, 173 we next tested whether the wild type mixed cells naturally alter the frequency of mixing 174 based on the concentrations of glucose and galactose. Just as the Nash equilibrium of the 175 pure strategists shifts with varying sugar concentrations, we observed that the mixing 176 frequency of the wild type yeast also shifts: in a higher concentration of galactose, yeast 177 adopt a higher GAL-ON frequency. This type of responsiveness is one of the hallmark 178 predictions of the mixed strategy model. Yeast is able to sense even small differences in 179 the ratio of glucose to galactose and adopts a pure OFF, pure ON, or appropriate mixed 180 strategy accordingly (Figure 4 and S1; also M. Springer personal communication). 181 182 Another prediction of the hawk-dove game is that a strain adopting a mixed ESS cannot 183 be invaded by either pure strategist. However, as the population frequency of the mixed 184 strategist approaches one, it becomes only neutrally uninvasible. In other words, in the 185 limit of a population consisting entirely of mixed strategists, any single invading cell 186 adopting any strategy (pure or mixed) will receive a payoff equal to the mixed strategist. 187
By competing the pure strategist strains (GAL-ON/OFF) with a strain containing the wild 188 type GAL network (mixed strategist), we determined that the mixed strategist is indeed 189 uninvasible by either pure strategist. Additionally, a competition between pure GAL-OFF 190 and the mixed strategist displays the neutral uninvasibility predicted from the game 191 theoretic model ( Figure 5A ). The wild type mixed strategy can spread in a population of 192 GAL-OFF cells, but as the wild type strategy increases in frequency, its advantage 193 disappears. Moreover, the wild type mixed strategist cells are uninvasible by the ON pure strategist at all frequencies ( Figure 5B Table 1 and deJong and Kupers' review 18 ). In this work we 208 have demonstrated a simple way of probing whether observed phenotypic heterogeneity 209 might be implementing an evolutionarily stable mixed strategy. By isolating the pure 210 strategies and probing them for mutual invasibility, we have determined that a hawk-dove 211 style foraging game is being played between the GAL-ON and GAL-OFF strategy. This 212 frequency-dependent mutual invasibility distinguishes a mixed ESS from bet-hedging 213 (which does not rely on interactions within the population) and altruistic division of labor 214 (in which the altruistic phenotype is always less fit). We have also verified the theoretical 215 prediction that the evolutionarily stable mixed strategy is not necessarily optimal for 216 growth, and confirmed that a strain implementing a mixed strategy invades populations 217 of both pure strategists, and is uninvasible by either. 218
219
In the mixed sugar conditions we have shown, the wild type mixing frequency is roughly 220 the same as the Nash equilibrium between the mutant pure strategists (compare figure 1d  221 with figure 2b ). However, we do not expect the quantitative agreement to be general, 222 since budding yeast did not evolve its mixing frequency in laboratory cultures of mixed 223 glucose and galactose. There are also slight differences between the mutants and the 224 wild-type phenotypes. For example, the GAL-repressed subpopulation of the mixed 225 strategist adopts a diauxic growth phenotype: it activates its GAL network upon glucose 226 depletion ( Figure S3 ), but because of the doxycycline induction of GAL80, the GAL-OFF 227 pure strategist does not transition to GAL-ON within the time frame of the competition 228 ( Figure S3 ). Consequently, in a mixed sugar scenario, the GAL-suppressed fraction of the 229 mixed strategist is likely to be more fit than the GAL-OFF pure strategist. Additionally, 230 the GAL-ON pure strategist's induction activates the GAL network to a greater degree 231 than the induction in the wild type ( Figure 1D) , resulting in slightly different costs for 232 expressing the GAL network. Also, while the majority of the wild type yeast's stochastic 233 decision to be GAL-OFF or GAL-ON is determined early, there is a small amount of 234 stochastic switching between the states ( Figure S4 The Gal80-inducible (GAL-OFF pure strategist) strain has a double GAL80 deletion. P TETO2 -GAL80 is inserted at one ura3 locus, while P MYO2 -rtTA is inserted at an ade2 locus. The GAL3-inducible (GAL-ON pure strategist) strain has a double GAL3 deletion with P TETO2 -GAL3 inserted at a ura3 locus and PMYO2-rtTA inserted at an ade2 locus.
Complete genotypes for the strains are found in the Supplementary Information.
Competitions: To initiate doxycycline induction in pure strategists, strains were initially 251 mixed at desired initial frequencies from plated colonies, then incubated in 1.0 µg/mL 252 doxycycline and 0.01% (w/v) glucose for 24 hours from a starting density of ~3x10 4 253 cells/mL to a saturating density of ~6x10 6 cells/mL, then diluted to ~3x10 4 In evolutionary game theory, an individual's strategy is a specification of what phenotype an individual will adopt in any situation in which it may find itself. Strategies can be deterministic (pure strategies) or probabilistic distributions over the pure strategies (mixed strategies). The central concept in evolutionary game theory is the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). An ESS is a strategy such that "if all members of the population adopt it, then no mutant strategy could invade the population under the influence of natural selection." 22 Evolutionarily stable strategies are subsets of Nash equilibria from classical game theory.
Evolutionarily stable mixed strategies (mixed ESS) are a class of ESS that arise in "anticoordination" games, or games in which rare strategies are favored over common ones. The canonical example of these is the two-player symmetric hawk-dove game as described by Maynard Smith 22 . In this game, two animals are competing over a resource of value V, and each animal has two pure strategies available: to fight (Hawk) or retreat (Dove) from a fight. There are three possible pairings in a symmetric two-player Hawk-Dove game:
1. If Hawk meets Dove (H,D), Dove flees and Hawk gets the resource (V). Dove retreats and receives a payoff of zero. 2. If Hawk meets Hawk (H,H) they fight. Each has a ½ probability of getting the resource, but only after incurring an injury cost (C) greater than the value of the resource. Their expected payoff is ½ (V-C), which is less than the payoff from retreating. 3. If Dove meets Dove (D,D) they share the resource. Their expected payoff is ½ (V) In matrix notation, the payoffs are as follows (payoffs are to the left player): 
Suppose now that individuals can implement a mixed strategy. We will define strategy I as "play Hawk with probability p, and Dove with probability (1-p)." The evolutionarily stable mixed strategy (mixed ESS) will be to choose p such that E(H, I) = E(D, I). In other words, any single invader will be indifferent to playing either Hawk or Dove (or, consequently, any possible probabilistic combination of the two). Therefore, an isogenic population playing the mixed ESS would be uninvasible by a single newcomer implementing any other strategy, pure or mixed.
It is important to note that while the ESS is uninvasible, it is not the strategy that maximizes the payoff. If V=1 and C=3, for example, the mixed ESS is to play Hawk with frequency 1/3. The evolutionarily stable population receives a mean payoff of 1/3, whereas a population of pure Doves receives the maximum mean payoff of 1/2. Below are plots detailing the payoffs by strategy (upper) and for the overall population (lower), as functions of the frequency of Hawks when C = 3V. Figure 1 . A simple foraging game with multiple food sources can favor phenotypic heterogeneity a, A simple foraging game with a mixed Nash equilibrium. Each member of a group of foragers is confronted with a binary decision about whether to specialize in consuming food source A or B. We assume that individuals choose simultaneously and without knowledge of the actions of others. Resource limitation makes it a game; each individual's payoff is a function of the actions of other individuals. b, If all other members of the population adopt some pure strategy (e.g. "specialize in food A"), an individual opting for the opposite pure strategy (e.g. "specialize in food B") gains a fitness advantage (top and middle panels). The Nash equilibrium of the simple foraging game is reached when the population divides between the two sources such that both phenotypes receive the same fitness and there is no fitness incentive for any single individual to change strategies (lower panel). In such a game, if each individual adopts the mixed strategy that stochastically chooses between pure strategies with the equilibrium probabilities, then that mixed strategy is evolutionarily stable. Though this game is not necessarily representative of real life foraging scenarios, it serves to illustrate why we might expect environments with multiple food sources to favor the evolution of mixed strategies. c, Gene expression in the yeast GAL network is regulated in part by GAL4, GAL80, and GAL3 (full network not shown). A GAL-OFF pure strategist is engineered by inducing the expression of GAL80, whose protein product inhibits GAL expression. Likewise a GAL-ON pure strategist can be engineered by inducing expression of GAL3, which inhibits GAL80 in the presence of galactose. d, In a mixed sugar environment (0.03% glucose, 0.05% galactose), "GAL-ON" and "GAL-OFF" pure strategists remain unimodally activated and inactivated, respectively, while the wild type GAL network exhibits bimodal gene expression. Cultures in Figure 1d were initially grown overnight in 0.01% (w/v) glucose and 1ug/mL doxycycline to saturation, then diluted to an OD of 0.002 and grown 8 hours in mixed glucose and galactose before measuring GAL activation via flow cytometry. The mixing frequency of the wild type mixed strategist is highly responsive to sugar concentrations. GAL network activation level is shown for nine different mixtures of glucose and galactose. From a bimodal expression state, more galactose in the media results in a higher frequency of cells with GAL activation, while more glucose in the media has the opposite effect. This trend is essential to the implementation of an evolutionary stable mixed strategy.
FIGURES
Figure. 2. Characterization of the game played between GAL-OFF and GAL-ON
Figure 5. Wild type mixed strategist invades both pure strategists and is uninvasible by either.
Relative fitness of the wild type mixed strategist over the GAL-OFF pure strategist (a) and GAL-ON pure strategist (b) is shown. Low frequencies of the mixed strategist invade strongly in populations dominated by either pure strategist. As expected of an evolutionarily stable mixed strategy, the relative fitness of the mixed strategist to the GAL-OFF pure strategist approaches one in populations dominated by the mixed strategist. However, the mixed strategist does not display frequency dependence against the GAL-ON pure strategist. 
